TODO

      

@INPROCEEDINGS{ranjbar_loris_2025,
  author = { Ranjbar, Ali and Yang, Tianchang and Tu, Kai and Khalilollahi, Saaman and Hussain, Syed Rafiul },
  booktitle = { 2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) },
  title = {{ Stateful Analysis and Fuzzing of Commercial Baseband Firmware }},
  year = {2025},
  ISSN = {2375-1207},
  pages = {1120-1139},
  doi = {10.1109/SP61157.2025.00143},
  url = {https://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00143},
  publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
  address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA},
  month = May
}

      

@inproceedings {ORANalyst,
author = {Tianchang Yang and Syed Md Mukit Rashid and Ali Ranjbar and Gang Tan and Syed Rafiul Hussain},
title = {{ORANalyst}: Systematic Testing Framework for Open {RAN} Implementations},
booktitle = {33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24)},
year = {2024},
isbn = {978-1-939133-44-1},
address = {Philadelphia, PA},
pages = {1921--1938},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/yang-tianchang},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}

      

@inproceedings{5GCVerif,
author = {Akon, Mujtahid and Yang, Tianchang and Dong, Yilu and Hussain, Syed Rafiul},
title = {Formal Analysis of Access Control Mechanism of 5G Core Network},
year = {2023},
isbn = {9798400700507},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
address = {New York, NY, USA},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623113},
doi = {10.1145/3576915.3623113},
abstract = {We present 5GCVerif, a model-based testing framework designed to formally analyze the access control framework of the 5G Core. With its modular design, 5GCVerif employs various abstraction techniques to craft an abstract model that captures the intricate details of the 5G Core's access control mechanism. This approach offers customizability and extensibility in constructing the abstract model and addresses the state explosion problem in model checking. 5GCVerif also sidesteps the challenge of exhaustively generating models for all possible core network configurations by restricting the model checker to explore policy violations only within the valid network configurations. Using 5GCVerif, we evaluated 55 security properties, leading to the discovery of five new vulnerabilities in 5G Core's access control mechanism. The uncovered vulnerabilities can result in multiple attacks including unauthorized entry to sensitive information, illegitimate access to services, and denial-of-services.},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
pages = {666–680},
numpages = {15},
keywords = {5g core network, access control, formal analysis, vulnerabilities},
location = {Copenhagen, Denmark},
series = {CCS '23}
}